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Introduction
WHEN PRESIDENT NIXON APPOINTED Associate Justice William
Rehnquist to the Supreme Court in 1971, he expected Rehnquist to
be a "law-and-order" justice who would help roll back some of the
perceived excesses of the Warren Court. Presidents, famously, don't
always get what they expect with Supreme Court Justices'-Nixon did.
Rehnquist consistently sided with the government in criminal cases
during his tenure on the Burger Court and managed, as ChiefJustice,
to implement much of the constitutional criminal procedure vision
that made Rehnquist appealing to both Nixon and later to President
Reagan, who elevated Rehnquist to Chief Justice. 2
Rehnquist's approach, however, was judicious. Rather than ex-
plicitly overruling precedent,3 he frequently pruned back and re-
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1. RichardJ. Lazarus, Rehnquist's Court, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 861, 862 (2003) ("History
is notoriously littered with Presidents who have been unpleasantly surprised by the subse-
quent votes of Justices whom they nominated for the Court."). Lazarus identifies Chief
Justice Warren andJustices Brennan, White, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter as examples of
justices who disappointed the presidents who appointed them. Id.
2. See id. at 863 (noting that Nixon got "just what he wanted" with Justice Rehnquist,
who reflected the President's views on both criminal procedure and federalism); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Understanding the Rehnquist Court: An Admiring Reply to Professor Merrill, 47 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 659, 660 (2003) ("[T]hroughout its existence, the Rehnquist Court has con-
sistently ruled against criminal defendants and in favor of the government.").
3. See David M. Burke, The "Presumption of Constitutionality" Doctrine and the Rehnquist
Court: A Lethal Combination for Individual Liberty, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73, 74-75
(1994) ("[I]ts critics have unjustly accused the Rehnquist Court of running roughshod
over precedent .... [T]he rate at which the Rehnquist Court has expressly overruled
precedent is less than that of both the brazenly activist Warren Court and the less audacious
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shaped Warren-era rulings, such as Mapp v. Ohio4 and Miranda v.
Arizona.5 In other cases, he exploited and expanded upon police-
friendly Warren-era precedent, such as Terry v. Ohio.6 While generat-
ing less attention than his doctrinal developments in the area of feder-
alism,7 Rehnquist's development of modern criminal procedure
jurisprudence is a significant legacy.8 Rehnquist's sustained effort to
pare back the expansive interpretations of defendants' constitutional
rights in the Warren era has been accompanied by equally or more
significant restrictions on habeas corpus review.9
but nonetheless activist Burger Court." (footnote omitted)); cf William Kristol, The Judici-
ary: Conservatism's Lost Branch, 17 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 131-32 (1994) ("During the
Reagan-Bush era, liberal constitutional doctrines were not rolled back to the extent hoped
for by many in the conservative movement .... In criminal justice, though some practical
effects of Warren and Burger Court decisions were significantly limited, the basic structure
erected by liberals remains." (footnote omitted)).
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the states for Fourth
Amendment violations).
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive
and must be preceded by warnings). Several cases have limited the impact of Mapp and
Miranda, including: Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (developing a flexible "totality of
the circumstances" test for determining probable cause in the Fourth Amendment con-
text); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (developing a public safety exception to
Miranda); and Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (reaffirming Miranda but not-
ing that its impact has been blunted through later doctrinal developments).
6. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (allowing an officer to "stop and frisk" a suspect upon reasona-
ble suspicion).
7. Extensive scholarship has been devoted to Rehnquist's contributions in the area
of federalism. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Prelim-
inary Analysis, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 569, 569 (2003) (focusing largely on federalism in ana-
lyzing the Rehnquist Court). Conversely, Rehnquist's criminal procedure has sometimes
been overlooked. See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 660 (noting that Professor Merrill's
analysis of the Rehnquist Court "quite strikingly ... omits" criminal procedure cases). But
see CharlesJ. Ogletree, Jr., The Rehnquist Revolution in Criminal Procedure, in THE REHNQUIST
COURT: JUDICIAL AcrnvisM ON THE RIGHT 55, 55-69 (Herman Schwartz ed., 2002). Recent
developments suggest Rehnquist's federalism legacy may be at risk. See Michael Halley,
With Recent Supreme Court Rulings, Era of States'Rights is Over, L.A. DAILJ.,July 14, 2005, at 8.
An analysis of Rehnquist's federalism legacy, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
8. See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 661 ("As the Rehnquist era nears its completion,
there can be little doubt that William Rehnquist was enormously successful-perhaps as
much as any Chief Justice in history-in shaping constitutional law to his ideological vi-
sion."); see also Ogletree, supra note 7, at 55-69.
9. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (opinion written by Scalia and
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (opinion
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 1051 (1996) (opinion writ-
ten by Chief Justice Rehnquist); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (opinion written by
O'Connor and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981)
(opinion written by Justice Rehnquist); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (opinion
written by Justice Rehnquist); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (opinion written by
Powell and joined by justice Rehnquist).
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Rehnquist's efforts to implement his vision often met strong op-
position. Particularly in Rehnquist's years as an Associate Justice, Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall were his most consistent adversaries in
cases involving the rights of criminal defendants.10 Their dissent from
Rehnquist's vision was perhaps a foregone conclusion, given their cen-
tral role in the development of Warren-Court jurisprudence and
strong commitment to individual rights. In the waning years of the
Rehnquist Court, however, Justice Scalia emerged, perhaps surpris-
ingly, as a critic of Rehnquist's approach to many aspects of criminal
procedure. The pragmatic balancing approach to the Fourth Amend-
ment that has been emblematic of Rehnquist is anathema to Scalia,
who prefers clear rules and a return to Fourth Amendment "first prin-
ciples."'11 In the confessions law context, Scalia was scathing in his crit-
icism of Rehnquist's opinion in Dickerson v. United States.12 In that
opinion, Rehnquist tepidly reaffirmed Miranda in the wake of many
other decisions, authored or joined by Rehnquist, that undermined
Miranda and suggested that he did not agree with the underlying deci-
sion."' Perhaps most significantly, Scalia garnered majorities in two
recent Sixth Amendment cases that-at least arguably-vindicated
the rights of defendants in the sentencing and Confrontation Clause
contexts.14
In the Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts, Rehnquist left the
Court with a body of criminal procedure jurisprudence strongly favor-
ing the government and made significant inroads into the largely pro-
defendant legacy of the Warren Court. While the Burger Court has
been described as the "counterrevolution that wasn't,"1 5 Rehnquist
10. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 674 (1984) (Marshall dissenting, with
Brennan and Stevens, from opinion written by Justice Rehnquist creating "public safety"
exception to Miranda); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 274 (1983) (Brennan dissenting, with
Marshall, from opinion written by Justice Rehnquist applying "totality of the circum-
stances" test for determining probable cause).
11. This phrase is taken from Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994). Also see Scalia's majority opinion in Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct.
1598, 1603-04 (2008) (citing Amar's emphasis on a founding-era understanding of the
Fourth Amendment with approval).
12. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
13. See discussion infra Part II.
14. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004); see also Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Tri-
umph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005).
15. See, e.g., THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent
Blasi ed., 1983) [hereinafter, THE BURGER COURT]; KENNETH NA1. STARR, FIRST AMONG
EQUALS: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 16 (2002) (crediting a "student of the
Burger Court" for the phrase). But see Preface to THE BURGER COURT, supra, at xi-xii.
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engineered a strategic mitigation project that largely succeeded, de
facto, in undoing much of the work of the Warren Court. This Article
will focus, however, on the relative failures of Rehnquist's vision in the
Sixth Amendment context, where Scalia's insistence on clear rules
trumped Rehnquist's more pragmatic approach. 16
While it is conventional to assess the impact of a particular Chief
Justice's "Court,"17 I focus somewhat differently on the role of Rehn-
quist as an individual Justice. This is for two reasons. First, Rehnquist
was an important member of the Burger Court before he assumed the
role of Chief Justice, and many of his doctrinal innovations were de-
veloped or rooted in that period. Second, as one scholar has recently
noted, the Court is "composed of nine individual justices, each with
his or her own legal philosophy." 18 The Rehnquist Court was particu-
larly "fractured" and reached "consistent and predictable 5-4 votes
along many issues, which makes it all the more difficult to talk in
terms of a unitary, dominant judicial philosophy."19 It is not difficult,
however, to discern a unitary and dominant judicial philosophy with
respect to the late Chief Justice, 20 a philosophy Kenneth Starr de-
16. See Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 991, 1012-13 (2004) ("In a number of cases, Justice Scalia has sided with
criminal defendants against the government because he believed that a clear rule sup-
ported that result." (footnote omitted)); cf id. at 1012 ("Professor Kannar has demon-
strated persuasively that Justice Scalia's Fourth and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence is
more a reflection of Scalia's rigid formalism than of any substantive predilections for or
against criminal defendants or, for that matter, any judgments about originalism in consti-
tutional interpretation." (citing George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin
Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1302, 1321-23 (1990))).
17. Cf Merrill, supra note 7, at 569 (2003) (noting that although the Court is "implic-
itly assumed to have a certain unity of character under each Chief Justice .... [a] closer
look at history reveals that this assumption of a natural Court defined by the tenure of each
Chief Justice is often misleading"); id. at 569-70 (arguing that there have been two Rehn-
quist Courts, with the second defined as the period between October 1994 and the time of
his writing, when the makeup of the Court was stable).
18. Ogletree, supra note 7, at 56.
19. Id.; cf Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was it Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger
Court (Is it Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER
COURT, supra note 15, at 81 ("Justice Rehnquist may be willing and eager to dismantle the
work of the Warren Court in the search and seizure area, but it has become increasingly
clear that neither he nor he and the [C]hief J]ustice constitute 'the Burger Court.'").
20. See EDWARD P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 105 (1998) (describing Rehnquist's
role as head of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel at the time of his nomina-
tion). Lazarus writes: "In that role, Rehnquist had urged sharp cutbacks in federal habeas
corpus, defended the legality of wiretapping, preventive detention, and 'no-knock'
searches, and urged strong countermeasures to even nonviolent civil disobedience by
protesters he denounced as 'the new barbarians.'" Id.; cf Roderick E. Walston, Blackmun's
Philosophical Shift Hurt U.S. Jurisprudence, L.A. DMLV J., June 10, 2005, at 10 (describing
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scribed as "uncompromisingly conservative." 2 1 That view was often,
but not always, reflected in the views of "his" Court. The Rehnquist
Court is the Court that invalidated the federal sentencing guidelines
in United States v. BookeY-2 and radically reshaped Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence in Crawford v. Washington.23 But those cases in no way
reflected Rehnquist's own jurisprudential preferences. Rehnquist was
a consistent supporter of the federal guidelines and supported a pre-
Crawford understanding of the Confrontation Clause. Over Rehn-
quist's differing views, 24 both Booker and Crawford reflected the com-
peting views of Scalia with regard to the scope of the rights to trial by
jury and the Confrontation Clause.2 5
Part I of this Article will briefly sketch the judicial philosophy of
Justice Scalia as contrasted with that of Rehnquist. The remainder of
the Article will then analyze how those competing visions were re-
flected in the Court's Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence before the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist. Part II will briefly
outline Rehnquist's impact on modern search and seizure law and
Fifth Amendment confessions jurisprudence, where he presided over
an increasingly police-friendly approach to the Fourth Amendment
Justice Rehnquist's "well-developed views ofjurisprudence," which remained constant over
his career on the Court).
21. STARR, supra note 15, at 15.
22. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
23. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
24. As discussed more fully below, ChiefJustice Rehnquist dissented from the "merits"
majority opinion in Booker, though he joined the "remedial" majority opinion, from which
Scalia dissented. The Booker merits majority flowed naturally from earlier Scalia opinions in
the sentencing context, from which Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. In Crawford, Chief
Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion, protesting Scalia's majority decision to re-
formulate the traditional Confrontation Clause test.
25. See discussion infra Parts III-IV; see also discussion supra note 24. As is explained
supra, Booker was a complex opinion with a merits majority and a remedial majority made
up of different groupings ofjustices. Scalia joined the merits majority ("Booker A"), which
found the federal guidelines unconstitutional as they then existed. See M.K.B. Darmer, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely and Booker: The Limits of Congressional Tolerance
and a Greater Role for Juries, 56 S.C. L. REV. 533, 534, 558-64 (2005). "[I]n Booker A, the
Court held that a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when ajudge increases a defendant's
sentence based upon factual findings made by the judge rather than a jury." Id. at 534. A
different majority, the remedial majority ("Booker I'), salvaged the guidelines by rendering
them no longer mandatory and by imposing a reasonableness standard on appeal. Id.
Scalia joined Stevens's opinion in Booker A and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented; Chief
Justice Rehnquistjoined Breyer's majority opinion in BookerB and Scalia dissented. Id. n.6.
Booker A was a "natural outgrowth" of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), authored
by Scalia, which invalidated factual findings "made by the judge rather than a jury" in a
state sentencing scheme. Darmer, supra, at 534; see also infra notes 180-93 and accompany-
ing text.
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and where his efforts to blunt the impact of Miranda represented an
almost categorical triumph. Part III will then trace the differences be-
tween Scalia and Rehnquist with regard to Sixth Amendmentjurispru-
dence, examining how those competing visions played out in the
context of the sentencing guidelines cases. Part IV will describe
Scalia's radical reshaping of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
A comprehensive assessment of all aspects of constitutional crimi-
nal procedure in the Rehnquist era is beyond the scope of this piece.
Rather, this Article focuses on the "lightning rod" issues of the Warren
Court era that largely motivated Rehnquist's appointment to the
Court and on the Sixth Amendment areas, which generated consider-
able attention in the twilight years of the Rehnquist Court. In all of
these areas, Scalia has been a sometimes critic of the late ChiefJustice,
often attacking his methodology, if not his results.
I. Two Conservative Justices; Two Quite Different
Approaches
Both Scalia and Rehnquist have been described as "brilliant"26
(though Scalia perhaps more frequently so). Both have impeccable
conservative credentials and little sentimentality when it comes to
criminal defendants. Their approaches to criminal procedure, how-
ever, frequently diverged.
A. Scalia's Democratic Formalism 27
President Reagan appointed Associate Justice Antonin Scalia to
the bench in 1986, filling the vacancy created by the retirement of
Chief Justice Burger and Rehnquist's ascension to Chief Justice. 28 As
Mark Tushnet recently wrote about Scalia's move into Rehnquist's
seat and the latter's move up to Chief Justice, "[c] onservatives luxuri-
ated in the thought that Rehnquist and Scalia would lead the Court
sharply to the right."29 Any assumption that Scalia would simply act in
lock-step with the Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, proved un-
founded. Rather, in several cases, Scalia "sided with criminal defen-
26. See STARR, supra note 15, at 15 (describing Rehnquist); Laurence H. Tribe, Rehn-
quist Was Brilliant Colleague Who Always Got Right to the Point, L.A. DAILYJ., Sept. 8, 2005, at 8
(same); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 367 (1993) (describing
Scalia).
27. This phrase is taken from Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Denocratic Formalism, 107
YALE L.J. 529 (1997) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)).
28. See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED 32 (2005).
29. Id. at 36.
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dants against the government because he believed that a clear rule
supported that result. '30 The sentencing guidelines and Confronta-
tion Clause cases are examples of this. 31
Other writers have thoroughly excavated Scalia's jurisprudence, 32
and it is beyond the scope of this Article to provide an exhaustive
description or critique of that jurisprudence. 33 Most scholars would
agree that important components of his approach are an emphasis on
constitutional text, commitments to "original meaning" and the "rule
of law" and a commitment to the separation of powers doctrine3 4 that
is skeptical of an expansive role for the judiciary in a democracy.
In 1989, Scalia outlined his view of the "Rule of Law" at the Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. Lecture at Harvard University. 35 In that lecture,
Scalia sought to explore "the dichotomy between general rules and
personal discretion within the narrow context of law that is made by the
courts. '3 6 He criticized the incrementalist approach of the common-
law system of deciding cases on narrow grounds, an approach that
leaves a large measure of discretion to future courts.37 Instead, he ad-
vocated that courts establish "as soon as possible a clear, general prin-
ciple of decision." 38 In his view, this paradigm leads to a better
30. Segall, supra note 16, at 1013.
31. See discussion infra Parts III-IV.
32. See, e.g., David M. Zlotnick, justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia's
Fidelity to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1378 (1999) (noting that Scalia
"has spawned a veritable academic cottage industry" and that more than fifty recent articles
"focus exclusively on some aspect of his jurisprudence"); Autumn Fox & Stephen R. McAl-
lister, An Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 19 CAMPBELL L. REv. 223,
224 (1997) (noting that "Scalia has been the focus of a maelstrom of scholarly attention");
Segall, supra note 16 (thoroughly describing Scalia's rule-oriented judicial philosophy);
Kannar, supra note 16 (analyzing the role of religion in developing Scalia's jurisprudence).
33. In his comprehensive article, Professor Zlotnick describes Scalia's constitutional
methodology. See Zlotnick, supra note 32, at 1380-1402. He further "establishes a frame-
work for the existing critiques of [Scalia's] jurisprude..ce." Id. at 1379; see also id. at
1403-26; Sunstein, supra note 27 (questioning whether Scalian formalism promotes demo-
cratic ideals); Segall, supra note 16 (contrasting Scalia's judicial philosophy with critiques
of legal rules and the rule of law made by critical legal studies scholars).
34. See Zlotnick, supra note 32, at 1388-1401; Fox & McAllister, supra note 32, at 225;
see also Segall, supra note 16, at 999-1004 (analyzing Scalia's own academic writings for
focus on rule of law and originalism).
35. The lecture was later published as an essay in the University of Chicago Law Re-
view. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 1175, 1175
(1989).
36. Id. at 1176. Accordingly, Scalia does not shy away from acknowledging that judges
"make law." Cf Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 155, 155-56
(1994) (arguing that judges make law but deny that they do).
37. Scalia, supra note 35, at 1177.
38. Id. at 1179.
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appearance of equal treatment, greater predictability and constraint
of judges, and the emboldening of judges to stand up to the popular
will.3 9
In 1997, the Princeton University Press published an essay by
Scalia on statutory construction and constitutional interpretation.40 In
that essay he described himself as a "textualist," and differentiated
that term from "so-called strict constructionism, a degraded form of
textualism that brings the whole philosophy into disrepute. '" 41 Accord-
ing to Scalia, a text should not be construed either "strictly" or "leni-
ently," but rather "reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means."42
In defending textualism, Scalia readily acknowledged that textu-
alism is "'formalistic.' -43 So, says Scalia, is the requirement that a very
guilty defendant must be convicted after a criminal trial before he can
be punished by the state:
A murderer has been caught with blood on his hands, bending
over the body of his victim; a neighbor with a video camera has
filmed the crime; and the murderer has confessed in writing and
on videotape. We nonetheless insist that before the state can pun-
ish this miscreant, it must conduct a full-dress criminal trial that
results in a verdict of guilty. Is that not formalism? Long live for-
malism. It is what makes a government a government of laws and
not of men. 44
In his review of Scalia's essay, Professor Cass R. Sunstein notes
that Scalia intended to "defend a species of democratic formalism."'45
39. Id. at 1179-80. On this last point, Scalia explains:
The chances that frail men and women will stand up to their unpleasant duty are
greatly increased if they can stand behind the solid shield of a firm, clear princi-
ple enunciated in earlier cases. It is very difficult to say that a particular convicted
felon who is the object of widespread hatred must go free because, on balance, we
think that excluding the defense attorney from the line-up process in this case
may have prevented a fair trial. It is easier to say that our cases plainly hold that,
absent exigent circumstances, such exclusion is a per se denial of due process.
Id. at 1180. For a thorough analysis of the lecture, see Segall, supra note 16, at 999-1002.
40. The essay was published in a book that also included commentary on Scalia's essay
and his response. See SCALIA, supra note 27. For a review of the book, see Donald J. Kochan,
The Other Side of the Coin: Implications for Policy Formation in The Law of Interpretation, 6 COR-
NELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'y 463 (1997).
41. Id. at 23.
42. Id. To illustrate his view of textualism, he pointed to Smith v. United States, 508 U.S.
223 (1993). The majority in that case found that a defendant "use[d] ... a firearm" during
a drug trafficking crime when he offered an unloaded firearm in exchange for drugs, thus
subjecting the defendant to a sentencing enhancement. Id. at 225. Scalia criticized the
majority, noting that a "proper textualist [like himself] ... would surely have voted to
acquit." SCALIa, supra note 27, at 23-24.
43. SCALIA, supra note 27, at 25.
44. Id.
45. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 530.
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We might even say that Justice Scalia is the clearest and most self-
conscious expositor of democratic formalism in the long history of
American law .... Above all, he seeks to develop rules of interpre-
tation that will limit the policymaking authority and decisional dis-
cretion of the judiciary, the least accountable branch of
government.46
Scalian opinions frequently return to the theme of judges as rep-
resenting a counter-majoritarian force whose role should be sharply
circumscribed. 4 7 For example, in his dissent from Justice Rehnquist's
7-2 Dickerson decision affirming Miranda, Scalia protested that Miranda
"has come to stand for the proposition that the Supreme Court has
power to impose extraconstitutional constraints upon Congress and
the States. This is not the system that was established by the Framers,
or that would be established by any sane supporter of government by
the people. ' '48
B. Rehnquist's Pragmatic Paternalism
While he espoused many of the same views as Scalia in terms of
fidelity to constitutional text and the role of the judiciary as appropri-
ately limited,49 Rehnquist's criminal procedure jurisprudence re-
flected a more pragmatic bent than Scalia's. As Professor Laurence
Tribe stated in the wake of the late Chief Justice's death, "Rehnquist
was attentive to legal doctrine but impatient with legalisms that ig-
nored reality. His strong pragmatic streak, differentiating him from
those on his right, was manifest. ' '5O In addition, despite protests re-
garding thejudiciary's limited role, many strands of Rehnquist's crimi-
nal procedure jurisprudence reveal a large scope of sanguinity
46. Id.
47. Cf Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Counterma-
joritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
48. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 465 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. For example, in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), where Justice Rehnquist
dissented from the invalidation of state death penalty provisions, he wrote: "The task of
judging constitutional cases imposed by [Article] III cannot ... be avoided, but it must
surely be approached with the deepest humility and genuine deference to legislative judg-
ment. Today's decision to invalidate capital punishment is, I respectfully submit, signifi-
candy lacking in those attributes." Id. at 468 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Blackmun and Powell joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent. Justice Rehn-
quist also took this view in his extrajudicial writings and in interviews. See, e.g., William H.
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. Rav. 693 (1976) (criticizing the
notion that the Court should take action simply because other branches of Government
have failed to); see alsoJohn A. Jenkins, The Partisan: A Talk WithJustice Rehnquist, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Mar. 3, 1985, at 28, 34 (quoting Rehnquist for the proposition that the Court, as
an "undemocratic" institution, should have a "circumscribed" role).
50. Tribe, supra note 26.
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regarding an expansive judicial role. Indeed, many cases reveal a
'judges know best" mentality, and Rehnquist was quick to find "harm-
less error" in cases where judges committed constitutional errors
when presiding over cases involving obviously guilty defendants. 5 1 He
also displayed far less concern than Scalia about judges invading the
province of the jury.52 In this way, I characterize his views as
"paternalistic."
Where a Scalian opinion typically focuses closely on the text of
the amendment at issue, Rehnquist spent much more time-and paid
much more deference to-precedent. 53 As others have noted, Rehn-
quist also had a tendency to focus, early in his opinions, on the facts-
often involving despicable deeds done by defendants now demanding
that their convictions be overturned.5 4 This approach would lead an
average citizen almost instinctively to root for the police and against
any chance for the defendant's release. With Rehnquist's focus on
facts and businesslike discussion of precedent, with doctrine being
sometimes moderately narrowed, sometimes modestly expanded, he
very much appeared to be the "reasonable judge." He was often mea-
sured, deliberate, and ultimately, in a layperson's sense, "fair." While
the target of harsh academic criticism, 55 Rehnquist's approach largely
reflected the political mainstream, 56 which is one reason why it has
traction.
51. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999); see also discussion infra Part III.
52. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 16-17.
53. Compare Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860-70 (Scalia dissenting from majority
holding that Sixth Amendment does not categorically require face-to-face confrontation),
with White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist on
confrontation clause).
54. See, e.g., White, 502 U.S. at 349-51 (detailing allegations of sexual abuse of a four-
year-old girl).
55. See Stephanos Bibas, The Rehnquist Court's Ffith Amendment Incrementalism, 74 GEt.
WASH. L. REV. 1078, 1078 (2006) ("The conventional academic wisdom criticizes the Rehn-
quist Court's criminal procedure decisions and, in particular, its self-incrimination case
law.").
56. Cf id. at 1086-87 (noting that "one of the Warren Court's great mistakes was
articulating and imposing top-down theories without regard for their real-world import
and impact"); Keith E. Whittington, William H. Rehnquist: Nixon's Strict Constructionist, Rea-
gan's ChiefJustice, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 9 (Earl M.
Maltz ed., 2003) (noting that Nixon's presidential campaign attack on the Warren Court
was "a winning issue, as the public rated crime as one of the most important problems
facing the nation in 1968, and a large majority believed that the courts did not deal with
criminals harshly enough" (quotation omitted)); Bibas, supra note 55, at 1086-87 (noting
that rather than attacking Warren precedent with sweeping rules of its own, Rehnquist's
incrementalist approach "gradually moved self-incrimination doctrine onto firmer founda-
tions: deterrence, coercion, and admission of reliable statements and fruits").
[Vol. 43
SCALIAN SKEPTICISM AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
In addition, Rehnquist's innovations were modest, rather than
bold, 57 or at least they purported to be. "The law is at best an i~aexact
science," Rehnquist said in his extrajudicial writing, "and the cases our
Court takes to decide are frequently ones upon which able judges in
lower courts have disagreed. There simply is no demonstrably 'right'
answer to the question involved in many of our difficult cases.."58
Scalia might well demur.59
Rehnquist was also comfortable with the Court's ultimate author-
ity to "say what the law is."60 In affirming Miranda in his Dickerson opin-
ion, he made plain that legislative efforts to supplant Miranda in 18
U.S.C. § 350161 were impotent: "Congress may not legislatively super-
sede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution."62 In-
deed, as Professors Dorf and Friedman memorably put it, section 3501
was a "slap at the Court, and if any Court was likely to slap back" it was
Rehnquist's. 63
Linda Greenhouse, who has covered the Supreme Court for the
New York Times since 1978,64 five years after Rehnquist joined the
Court, recently described the late Chief Justice as "perhaps the lead-
ing modern expositor of judicial supremacy" who "committed his ten-
ure to the maximum exercise of the Supreme Court's power. '65
57. See STARR, supra note 15, at 21 (2002) (describing Chief Justice Rehnquist a 'judi-
cial pragmatist, a respecter of legal precedent, wary of sudden change"); Bibas, supra note
55, at 1086-87 (describing Rehnquist's incrementalist approach). But see STARR, supra note
15, at 16-17 (describing Rehnquist as more of a maverick as an Associate Justice, earning
the nickname "Lone Ranger" for his solitary dissents and for "attack[ing] Warren Court
precedents with relish"); SCHWARTZ, supra note 26, at 317 (describing the Lone Ranger doll
that Rehnquist's law clerks gave him as a gift). Schwartz also notes that Rehnquist dissented
alone fifty-four times as an Associate Justice-"a Court record." Id.
58. WILLIAM H. REHNQUisT, THE SUPREME COURT 255 (2001).
59. See Segall, supra note 16, at 1042 ("Justice Scalia likes his law simple, precise, and
clear: examine text and tradition and if at all possible, articulate a broad general rule.").
60. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
61. For a fuller discussion of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968), see M.K.B. Darmer, Lessons From
the Lindh Case: Public Safety and the Fifth Amendment, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 241, 268-69 & nn.
197-99 (2002).
62. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000).
63. MichaelJ. Doff & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 Sup. CT.
REv. 61, 72 (citing Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 883, 895 (2000)) (characterizing section 3501); cf Kevin McNamee, Do as I Say and
Not as I Do: Dickerson, Constitutional Common Law and the Imperial Supreme Court, 28 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1239 (characterizing the Rehnquist Court as "imperial").
64. See Linda Greenhouse, 2,691 Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at WKI; see also,
e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Last Days of the Rehnquist Court: The Rewards of Patience and
Power, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 251 (2003) [hereinafter Greenhouse, The Last Days] (discussing
Rehnquist's impact on the Court).
65. Greenhouse, The Last Days, supra note 64, at 257.
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In the Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts, he exercised this
power remarkably effectively.
II. Rehnquist's Successful Fourth and Fifth Amendment
Jurisprudence
The two cases that came to symbolize the perceived excesses of
the Warren Court in protecting the rights of criminal defendants were
Mapp v. Ohio and Miranda v. Arizona.66 Mapp, which involved an un-
lawful search, applied the exclusionary rule to the states in search and
seizure cases, effectively limiting the evidence that could be used at
trial if a search violated a defendant's rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment.67 Miranda held that custodial interrogation was "inherently co-
ercive," and for the first time applied the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition on compelled self-incrimination to stationhouse question-
ing, requiring officers to provide warnings to arrestees before ques-
tioning them.68 Both opinions were widely criticized in pro-police
quarters, and Nixon appointed Rehnquist to the Court as a counter-
weight to those decisions.69
Though Rehnquist failed to overrule Mapp as he set out to do, he
authored and joined important opinions that blunted the impact of
Mapp. For example, he created a "good faith" exception to the war-
rant requirement, 70 and loosened the standard for probable cause. 71
He also generally presided over an "exception-based"jurisprudence in
the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court paid lip service to
its supposed preference for warrants but carved out an ever-ex-
panding list of exceptions to the general rule requiring warrants. 72
66. Kamisar, supra note 19.
67. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
68. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
69. See Whittington, supra note 56, at 9-11.
70. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (creating a good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule).
71. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (applying a totality of the circumstances
test to anonymous informant tips and rejecting the two-prong probable cause test from
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)).
72. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Thornton v. United
States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004), carved out a new exception to the warrant requirement, per-
mitting the warrantless search of a "recent occupant" of a car. Id. at 623-24; cf Craig M.
Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the Rehnquist Court: Has the Rehnquisition Begun?, 62 IND. L.J.
273, 275 (1987) (describing the Burger Court's retreat from Warren Court decisions, and
noting that "the [Burger] Court's major search decisions have been essentially uniform in
favoring the police").
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With regard to Miranda, Rehnquist had an even more direct im-
pact, taking charge of the doctrine and reshaping it to his preferred
limits. In 1974, it was Associate Justice Rehnquist who first described
the Miranda warnings as merely "prophylactic," as distinct from consti-
tutionally required. 73 That description, in Michigan v. Tucker, helped
launch a series of cases creating exceptions to Miranda and restricting
its natural implications.7 4 The rationale in many of the Court's later
limiting decisions derived directly from Rehnquist's opinion in
Tucker.7 5 When Rehnquist ultimately wrote the 7-2 majority opinion
"reaffirming" Miranda in 2001 in Dickerson v. United States,7 6 it was no
longer Earl Warren's Miranda-it was Rehnquist's.
While joining many of its opinions, Justice Scalia was at times a
blistering critic of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence in both the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts. He has disparaged the excep-
tion-riddled "warrant requirement,"7 7 preferring fewer balancing
tests, more bright lines and historical context, and-of course-more
fidelity to constitutional text.78 In the Fifth Amendment context,
73. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974).
74. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (holding that the "fruits" of a Mi-
randa violation were admissible, such that a statement preceded by warnings could be used
despite the exclusion of an earlier statement that was not preceded by warnings); New York
v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (opinion written by Justice Rehnquist creating a "public
safety" exception to the Miranda warnings requirements).
75. Tucker itself permitted the trial testimony of a witness discovered as a result of an
unwarned statement taken before Miranda was decided. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 452; see also
Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 100
(noting that ten of eleven then-recent Supreme Court decisions interpreted Miranda so as
not to require exclusion of the confession at issue); Leslie A. Lunney, The Erosion of Mi-
randa: Stare Decisis Consequences, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 727, 746 (1999) ("Rather than over-
turn Miranda, the Burger and later Rehnquist Courts set about to limit its reach by
interpreting Miranda's requirements narrowly and crafting exceptions to its commands.");
cf Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal Procedure: From
Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REv. 359, 402 (2001) ("Although the
Court limited the potential effects of Miranda in subsequent decades, the central holding
was repeatedly reaffirmed and even extended."). For a fuller discussion of the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts' treatment of Miranda, see Darmer, supra note 61, at 264.
76. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). For a thorough discussion of Dickerson from several different
perspectives, see Symposium, Miranda After Dickerson: The Future of Confessions Law, 99
MICH. L. REv. 879 (2001).
77. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part)
(describing that the "warrant requirement" has become "so riddled with exceptions" that it
is "basically unrecognizable"). In Thornton, Scalia concurred with ChiefJustice Rehnquist's
majority opinion extending an earlier rule, and suggested that the underlying rule should
be revisited. 541 U.S. at 625-32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
78. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (opinion written by Scalia over
ChiefJustice Rehnquist's dissent, finding that use of a thermal imaging device directed at a
home constituted a Fourth Amendment "search" requiring a warrant). For a more thor-
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Scalia preferred forthrightly to overrule Miranda, and was sharply criti-
cal of Rehnquist for failing to do so in Dickerson.79 With some excep-
tions,80 however, Rehnquist's pragmatic approach in these areas won
out over Scalia's more purist one. In Dickerson, for example, Rehn-
quist's spare majority opinion garnered a solid majority of seven,
achieving stability in the Court's confessions law jurisprudence, 81
whereas Scalia's dogmatic and vitriolic dissenting opinion garnered
only Justice Thomas's additional vote.82
III. Judicial Fact Finding and the Unraveling of the
Sentencing Guidelines
Concerning the Sixth Amendment as well as the Fourth and
Fifth, Rehnquist's views were more pragmatic, Scalia's more purist.
Scalia's and Rehnquist's sharply diverging views on the Sixth Amend-
ment are illustrated in Neder v. United States,8 3 a case decided well
before the later sentencing guidelines and Confrontation Clause
cases. In Neder, the trial judge erred in failing to submit to the jury the
question of whether misstatements in tax returns were material.84
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opinion, determined
that the error was harmless. 85 In doing so, he displayed supreme con-
fidence in the verdict, noting that the Government's evidence at trial
established the defendant's failure to report five million dollars in in-
come, a failure that "incontrovertibly establishes that Neder's false
statements were material . . . .In this situation, where a reviewing
court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element
was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence . . . the
erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless."86
ough discussion of Scalia's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see Richard H. Seamon,
Kyllo v. United States and the Partial Ascendance ofJustice Scalia's Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1013 (2001).
79. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 465 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27.
81. As Professor Stephen F. Smith noted, "[a]fter Dickerson, it would appear that Mi-
randa law is finally at an equilibrium that almost all of the Justices-including supporters
and critics of Miranda-can accept." Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80
TEX. L. REV. 1057, 1111 (2002).
82. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
84. Id. at 4.
85. The Court was unanimous in holding that materiality is, in fact, an element of the
federal mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes. Id. at 25. In a 5-4 decision, the Court also held
that the lower court's error in submitting the issue of materiality to the jury was harmless.
Id. at 4.
86. Id. at 16-17.
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Justice Scalia pointedly disagreed, describing the Sixth Amend-
mentjury trial guarantee as the "spinal column of American democ-
racy."8 7 Criticizing the Court's ruling for being based in part on "self-
esteem" and "pragmatism,"8 he emphasized that:
[ 7] he Constitution does not trust judges to make determinations of crimi-
nal guilt. Perhaps the Court is so enamoured of judges in general,
and federal judges in particular, that it forgets that they (we) are
officers of the Government, and hence proper objects of that
healthy suspicion of the power of government which possessed the
Framers and is embodied in the Constitution. 89
Though Neder dealt with neither the sentencing guidelines nor the
right to confrontation, Scalia's skepticism about judges ultimately
animated both Crawford and Booker.90
Rehnquist's sanguinity regarding the significance of a judge's
role at sentencing was evident in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.91 That
1986 case pre-dated the federal guidelines but endorsed the kind of
judicial fact finding under a "preponderance of the evidence" stan-
dard that characterized the later federal guidelines system. 92
In McMillan, the Court confronted a challenge to Pennsylvania's
mandatory minimum sentencing scheme, which required judges to
impose a five-year sentence upon any defendant who visibly possessed
a firearm during the commission of an underlying offense.93 The
scheme called for sentencing judges to make the factual finding re-
garding such firearm possession by a "preponderance of the evi-
dence," a finding that the Pennsylvania legislature explicitly deemed a
"sentencing factor" rather than an element of the underlying
offense. 94
Although several state sentencing judges operating under this sys-
tem found the scheme unconstitutional, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court disagreed, finding, among other things, that "the risk of error"
was "comparatively slight" because "visible possession is a simple,
87. Id. at 30 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. Id. at 39.
89. Id. at 32.
90. While Stevens, Scalia's ally in this area, wrote the Booker majority opinion invalidat-
ing the sentencing guidelines, it was a natural outgrowth of Scalia's Sixth Amendment
opinion in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
91. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
92. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997); see also Darmer, supra note 25, at
544-45 (noting controversies associated with "real offense sentencing" under the prepon-
derance standard).
93. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81.
94. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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straightforward issue susceptible of objective proof."95 The United
States Supreme Court affirmed, relying on prior precedent for the
notion that "in determining what facts must be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the state legislature's definition of the elements of the
offense is usually dispositive .... -96 Endorsing federalism principles,
moreover, Rehnquist noted that "we should not lightly construe the
Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration ofjustice by the
individual States."97
Moving beyond the burden of proof issue, Rehnquist gave short
shrift to petitioners' Sixth Amendment claim, explicitly noting that it
merited "little discussion."98 While petitioners argued that the jury was
required to determine all "ultimate facts" regarding the offense, the
Court disagreed: "Having concluded that Pennsylvania may properly
treat visible possession as a sentencing consideration and not an ele-
ment of any offense, we need only note that there is no Sixth Amend-
ment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific
findings of fact."99 He gave considerable deference to the ability of the
Legislature to mark out the difference between "elements of the of-
fense"-which must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt,
and "sentencing factors"-which need only be established to ajudge's
individual satisfaction, by a preponderance of the evidence. 100 Rehn-
quist himself coined the term "sentencing factor" in this opinion, 0 1 a
term that was to become critical in the future battle over sentencing
guidelines.
McMillan was decided in June 1986, before Scalia assumed Rehn-
quist's associate justiceship later that year. Early on, however, Scalia
marked out a different view of the appropriate roles of legislatures,
judges, and juries in the sentencing context.
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines-Background
The United States Sentencing Guidelines took effect on Novem-
ber 1, 1987, just one year after Justice Scalia ascended to the Supreme
95. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84.
96. Id. at 85.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 93.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. See Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 485 (noting that "for the first time, [the
McMillan Court] coined the term 'sentencing factor' to refer to a fact that was not found
by a jury but that could affect the sentence imposed by the judge" (quoting McMillan, 477
U.S. at 86)).
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Court. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the Sentencing
Commission, which was tasked with creating guidelines to constrain
the wide-ranging discretion judges had previously enjoyed in sentenc-
ing defendants. 10 2 Prior to the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines"), many commentators agreed that the discretionary re-
gime had led to substantial sentencing disparities, with similarly situ-
ated defendants in different federal courtrooms receiving significantly
different sentences for the same crimes. 10 3
The Guidelines sought to regularize the sentencing process and
make it more predictable. They are an intricate overlay with respect to
the federal penal code, requiring that sentencing judges make a series
of factual findings after conviction to determine where within a broad
statutory range a defendant should be punished. 10 4 Integral to the
Guidelines scheme is that sentencing decisions are largely driven by
those specific factual findings. For example, if a defendant distributed
ten kilograms rather than five grams of cocaine, he 10 5 would receive a
higher sentence. If he killed or maimed a victim in the course of a
bank robbery, he would receive a higher sentence than if he had sim-
ply brandished a weapon.
While Booker ultimately found that such judicial fact finding vio-
lated the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial where the facts found
increased the defendant's sentence, a specific challenge to such fact
finding was not made for many years, despite being the source of sus-
tained academic criticism. 10 6 Rather, initial attacks on the Guidelines
raised entirely different issues. In Mistretta v. United States,10 7 Scalia was
the lone dissenter in a case that upheld the Guidelines against consti-
102. See generally Darmer, supra note 25, at 539-45 (describing the history of the federal
sentencing guidelines).
103. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973); see also
Darmer, supra note 25, at 539-40 (describing Frankel's influential work bringing dispari-
ties to light, and the bipartisan support of liberal and conservative Senators bringing about
reform).
104. For a fuller description, see Darmer, supra note 25, at 540-45. For a thoughtful
book on the Guidelines, see KATE STITH &Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998).
105. My use of the male pronoun to refer to criminal defendants reflects the reality
that the vast majority of criminal defendants are male. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AN-
NUAL REPORT 33 (2006) (noting that males comprised 86.7% of all offenders sentenced in
2006).
106. See Darmer, supra note 25, at 544-45 (describing criticism lodged by others).
107. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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tutional claims that the system violated both separation of powers and
non-delegation doctrines.108
At first blush, it is remarkable that Scalia could have transformed
the Court's thinking so completely that it went from near-unanimity
on the Guidelines' ultimate constitutionality to a majority finding of
unconstitutionality. It turns out, however, that once the Court began
to focus on the Guidelines requirement that judges find facts beyond
(or even contrary to) those found by the jury in enhancing sentences,
Justice Scalia joined forces with the Court's most liberal member,
John Paul Stevens, in moving the Court towards invalidating the sys-
tem.10 9 In the series of cases described in Section B below, the Court
found that a system based upon judicial fact finding was inconsistent
with the Constitution's irreducible demands under the Sixth
Amendment.
B. Due Process and Sixth Amendment Challenges
Following Mistretta, the Court consistently rejected challenges to
the Guidelines until its jurisprudence "began to unravel."1 0 Apprendi
v. New Jersey"' explicitly raised a constitutional challenge to judicial
fact finding in sentencing. While it is conventional to mark Apprendi as
the beginning of the end of the Guidelines, the seeds of their destruc-
tion were actually planted in Stevens's dissenting opinion in McMillan
v. Pennsylvania, in which he disagreed with Rehnquist's view on the
amount of deference given to state legislatures in defining elements of
an offense. 1 2 Locating his objection in the Due Process Clause, Ste-
108. Indeed, the other eightjustices were unusually strongly united in the view that the
Guidelines were constitutional. Blackmun authored the majority opinion, which was joined
in full by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, White, Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and in all
but one footnote, by Brennan. Scalia asserted that despite their "modest name," the Guide-
lines "have the force and effect of laws." 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The major-
ity conceded as much because, with limited exceptions, the Guidelines required judges to
sentence within a narrow range determined by the factual nature of the crime (as found by
the judge) and the defendant's criminal history. Scalia dissented, however, noting that he
could find "no place within our constitutional system for an agency created by Congress to
exercise no governmental power other than the making of laws." Id. Rehnquist, on the
other hand,joined Blackmun's majority opinion in Mistretta and was a steadfast advocate of
the Guidelines system thereafter.
109. Scalia joined Stevens's majority opinion in Booker A, which found the current
Guidelines unconstitutional. See discussion supra note 25. Both Scalia and Stevens dis-
sented from the remedial portion of the opinion, which I have referred to as Booker B. Id.
110. See David J. Gottlieb, The Constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines, in PRACTICE
UNDER THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 10-17 (4th ed. 2005).
111. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
112. For a discussion of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), see supra notes
91-101 and accompanying text.
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vens found that "[o] nce a State defines a criminal offense," the State
must then "prove any component of the prohibited transaction that
gives rise to both a special stigma and a special punishment beyond a
reasonable doubt."113 Accordingly, Stevens concluded that Penn-
sylvania's mandatory minimum sentencing scheme violated the Con-
stitution because it required a judge to impose five years' additional
punishment for visible possession of a firearm even though such "pos-
session" was never proved beyond a reasonable doubt."14 The major-
ity, however, agreed with Rehnquist's analysis that a judge could
properly make such a finding by a preponderance of the evidence." 15
The issue of whether an aspect of the defendant's conduct is an
element of the offense" or merely a "sentencing factor," about which
Rehnquist and Stevens disagreed in McMillan, emerged again more
than a decade later in Almendarez-Torres v. United States. 16 Rehnquist
and Scalia were on opposite sides of that case, and Scalia's dissenting
opinion in Almendarez-Torres was important for later developments in
Sixth Amendment sentencing jurisprudence.
Almendarez-Torres involved a conviction under the "illegal reentry"
statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which provides different penalties for an alien
who illegally re-enters the country following deportation, depending
upon whether such alien has previously been convicted of an aggra-
vated felony. The difference in penalty is significant. Subsection (a)
provides a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment, whereas
subsection (b) provides a maximum penalty of twenty years for an
alien previously convicted of an aggravated felony." 7
Breyer wrote the 5-4 majority opinion in Almendarez-Torres, find-
ing that subsection (b) was merely "a penalty provision, which simply
authorizes a court to increase the sentence for a recidivist."' 1 8 Thus,
according to the majority, there was no constitutional error if the
judge made that decision. In the opinion, which Rehnquist joined,
Breyer relied heavily upon Rehnquist's prior opinion in McMillan.119
113. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Marshall, who dissented sepa-
rately, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, agreed with "much injustice [Stevens's] dissent"
and agreed, in particular, that "[wihether a particular fact is an element" that "must be
proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt is a question that must be decided
by this Court and cannot be abdicated to the States." Id. at 93 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 95-96. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. See discussion supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
116. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
117. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)-(b) (2) (2008).
118. 523 U.S. at 226.
119. See id. at 242. For a discussion of McMillan, see supra notes 91-100 and accompa-
nying text.
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Acknowledging differences between the two cases, Breyer noted that
recidivism is a traditional basis for a sentencing judge to increase a
defendant's sentence. 20
Scalia disagreed, noting that Almendarez-Torres involved the "diffi-
cult question whether the Constitution requires a fact which substan-
tially increases the maximum permissible punishment for a crime to
be treated as an element of that crime-to be charged in the indict-
ment, and found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury."' 21 That ques-
tion was at the heart of not only that case, but also later cases directly
challenging the constitutionality of sentencing guidelines. In deter-
mining that a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt was required,
Scalia's opinion bore traces of the earlier protestation Stevens had
lodged against Rehnquist's majority opinion in McMillan.
Almendarez-Torres and the cases that followed were closely divided.
In addition to Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Thomas joined the majority in Almendarez-Torres, while Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Scalia's dissent.
In Monge v. California,122 Scalia asserted, again in dissent, the view
that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial prevented a retrial of
sentencing proceedings. The majority resolved the case on double
jeopardy grounds, ruling that there was no violation of that protec-
tion,123 and though Scalia agreed with the doublejeopardy analysis he
found a violation of the Sixth Amendment, more forcefully articulat-
ing his earlier suggestion in Almendarez-Torres.
Scalia repeated this position the following year by concurring in
Jones v. United States,124 which involved the federal carjacking stat-
ute.125 The statute provided a sliding scale of penalties depending
upon how seriously the perpetrator injured his victim.' 26 Jones was
charged simply with carjacking absent specific reference to the stat-
ute's penalty provisions; indeed, the judge advised the defendant at
arraignment that the maximum penalty he faced for his crime was
fifteen years. 127 AfterJones was convicted by the jury of simple carjack-
ing, the judge presided over sentencing proceedings and ultimately
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Jones had inflicted
120. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243.
121. Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. 524 U.S. 721 (1998).
123. Id. at 724.
124. 526 U.S. 227, 253 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2008).
126. See id. § 2118(a)-(c).
127. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230-31.
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"serious bodily injury" upon the victim, leading the judge to impose
an enhanced sentence. 128
In an opinion for a 5-4 majority setting aside the sentence,Justice
Souter found that the "fairest reading" of the statute was that "serious
bodily harm" was an element of the offense, not just a sentencing en-
hancement that could be based upon a judge's finding. 129 In a foot-
note which later took on great significance, he stated that "under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment ... any fact (other than
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime
must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt."'130
Justices Stevens and Scalia each concurred separately. Scalia's
brief concurrence noted the evolution in his thinking since Al-
mendarez-Torres. "In dissenting in Almendarez-Torres I suggested the pos-
sibility, and in dissenting in Monge, I set forth as my considered view,
that it is unconstitutional to remove from the jury the assessment of
facts that alter the congressionally prescribed range of penalties to
which a criminal defendant is exposed.' 31 Stevens agreed with that
proposition but added that "[i]t is equally clear that such facts must
be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt,"132 reiterating the
position taken in his McMillan dissent.13 3 While agreeing that judicial
fact finding that enhances a defendant's sentence violates the Consti-
tution, Stevens has consistently rooted his primary objection in the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and Scalia in the jury
trial right of the Sixth.134
The Court's Jones decision, which set aside the defendant's en-
hanced sentence, generated a strong dissent. Perhaps predicting the
case's ultimate impact on sentencing guidelines, the dissent criticized
the majority's approach and found it inconsistent with Almendarez-
Torres. In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the dissent asserted
that:
Our precedents admit of no real doubt regarding the power of
Congress to establish serious bodily injury and death as sentencing
factors rather than offense elements, as we made clear in Al-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 239.
130. Id. at 243 n.6.
131. Id. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
132. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
133. See discussion supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
134. Compare McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
with Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 248 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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mendarez-Torres. Departing from this recent authority, the Court's
sweeping constitutional discussion casts doubt on sentencing prac-
tices and assumptions followed not only in the federal system but
also in many States.
13 5
As Professor Stephanos Bibas noted, 'Jones was the mirror image
of Almendarez-Torres"'36 in terms of the lineup ofjustices. The majority
in Jones, made up of the four Almendarez-Torres dissenters: Scalia, Ste-
vens, Ginsburg, and Souter, plus Justice Thomas (who had "changed
sides" 13 7) found a significant constitutional problem with judicial fact
finding leading to a higher sentence. This group, as further analyzed
by Bibas, "distrusted legislatures and judges, exalted juries, relied on
traditions of jury fact-finding, and adopted a strong rule of construc-
tion to avoid constitutional doubts."'1 38 The Jones dissenters-Ken-
nedy, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Breyer-conversely "wanted to defer
to legislatures, stressed traditional leeway for judicial fact-finding at
sentencing, and forecast that the elements rule would cause grave
practical problems."
1 3 9
Rehnquist had earlier emphasized deference to legislatures in up-
holding Pennsylvania's mandatory minimum sentencing scheme in
McMillan.'40 That case was decided in 1986 on a 5-4 margin, with Ste-
vens, Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun in dissent. With the depar-
ture of the latter three liberals from the Court in the intervening
years, it might have been expected that a stronger coalition would
have formed around the views expressed by Rehnquist in that earlier
case. Instead, while the Jones majority found its holding to be consis-
tent with McMillan, its focus was not on McMillan's core holding but
on dicta suggesting that its result might have been different if gun
possession in that case had "exposed a defendant to a sentence be-
yond the maximum that the statute otherwise set."1
4 1
Indeed, in the next important case in this line, Apprendi v. New
Jersey, Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, criticized Rehnquist's
earlier McMillan opinion as starting a "revolution in the law regarding
the definition of 'crime.'"142 In Thomas's view, the Court's Apprendi
135. Jones, 526 U.S. at 254 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
136. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty
Pleas, 110 YALE LJ. 1097, 1115 (2001).
137. Id. at 1111.
138. Id. at 1115.
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
141. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 242 (1999) (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)).
142. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 518 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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opinion (invalidating a sentencing enhancement), "far from being a
sharp break with the past, marks nothing more than a return to the
status quo ante--the status quo that reflected the original meaning of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.' 43
Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion in Apprendi, finding
that ajudicially imposed sentencing enhancement for the commission
of a hate crime violated the defendant's Due Process rights. 144 New
Jersey's hate crime law doubled the sentencing ranges for the weap-
ons possession charges to which Apprendi pled guilty. 145 The sentenc-
ing court had found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
Apprendi was guilty of a hate crime.146 The Supreme Court, relying
upon the constitutional concern articulated in its recent 5-4 Jones
opinion, found that a defendant is entitled to a jury finding of any
fact, "[o] ther than the fact of a prior conviction ... that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum."147 En-
dorsing the rule statement articulated in his own and Scalia's earlier
concurrences in Jones, Stevens now wrote for the majority that "'it is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assess-
ment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which
a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must
be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."1 48
The Jones dissenters, including Rehnquist, dissented again in Ap-
prendi. O'Connor and Breyer wrote separate dissenting opinions;
Rehnquist joined both. Breyer outlined the history and reasons be-
hind sentencing guidelines and vigorously defended the constitution-
ality of judicial fact finding in systems such as the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, in which he was deeply invested. 149 Respond-
ing specifically to Breyer's dissent, which extolled the virtues of the
Guidelines, Scalia derided Breyer's views as describing a "bureaucratic
realm of perfect equity" that failed to appreciate the commands of the
Constitution. 150
143. Id.
144. Id. at 491-92 (majority opinion).
145. Id. at 468-69.
146. Id. at 471.
147. Id. at 490.
148. Id. (quotingJones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999)).
149. Id. at 555-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Breyer's role in develop-
ing the Guidelines, see Darmer, supra note 25, at 553 n.16. See also Stephen Breyer, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1 (1998).
150. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Several years later in Blakely v. Washington,'51 Scalia authored the
majority opinion applying the logic of Apprendi to a state sentencing
scheme bearing a strong resemblance to the federal guidelines system.
Writing for the same 5-4 majority that previously decided Apprendi and
Jones, Scalia applied the rule of Apprendi and invalidated a sentence
based upon judicial fact finding, locating the defect squarely in the
Sixth Amendment. 15 2 Scalia's forceful opinion expanded upon Jones
and Apprendi and articulated a clear vision of the important role of the
jury in delimiting a defendant's sentence.
Blakely had kidnapped his estranged wife and later pled guilty to
second-degree kidnapping involving both domestic violence and a
firearm, a Class B felony. 153 His sentence of ninety months was at issue
in the case. 154 Under the terms of the plea agreement, the contem-
plated sentencing range was forty-nine to fifty-three months, reflecting
the "standard range" for the underlying crime. 155 Under Washing-
ton's law, the sentencing judge could impose a sentence higher than
the standard range only if the judge found "'substantial and compel-
ling reasons"' tojustify it.156 The judge imposed a higher sentence in
this case upon finding that Blakely had acted with "'deliberate cru-
elty.'- 157 Scalia found that the sentence violated Apprendi because the
judge imposed it acting alone, without benefit of jury findings or the
defendant's admission.1 58 The sentence was three years longer than
the fifty-three month sentence prescribed as the maximum of the
"standard range."' 59
The State argued that Blakely's sentence was consistent with Ap-
prendi because the relevant "statutory maximum" was ten years, the
151. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
152. Stevens's majority opinion in Apprendi was based upon the Due Process Clause, see
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469, as was his earlier opinion in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S.
79, 96 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298-99. Blakely pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with
the government. Id.
154. This discussion of Blakely borrows heavily from my discussion of that case in
Darmer, supra note 25, at 549-53.
155. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299.
156. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9.94A.120(2) (West 2000)).
157. Id. at 300 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.390(2) (h) (iii)). The judge
made an initial sentencing determination after hearing testimony from the defendant's
wife. Id. The defendant objected to the increase in his contemplated sentence, and the
judge then conducted a three-day hearing in which he heard from several witnesses. Id. At
the conclusion of that hearing, he issued a series of factual findings and adhered to his
initial sentencing determination. Id. at 300-01.
158. Id. at 303-04.
159. Id.
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maximum statutory term for Class B felonies. 160 Scalia rejected this
argument: "Our precedents make clear ... that the 'statutory maxi-
mum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by
the defendant."' 61 Scalia made plain that judicial fact finding that in-
creases a sentence is barred, regardless of whether the increase is pur-
suant to statute or a narrower Guidelines-type provision. As he put it:
"[t]he relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a
judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he
may impose without any additional findings."' 62 The judge "exceeds
his proper authority" and violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury when he "inflicts punishment that the jury's ver-
dict alone does not allow .... 163
Scalia suggested that the majority's holding was an application,
rather than an expansion, of Apprendi.164 He also asserted that a rejec-
tion of Apprendi's logic left two alternatives. In the first, the Legislature
has carte blanche to label elements of the crime merely "sentencing
factors" to be determined by the judge. Scalia used the dramatic ex-
ample of a judge sentencing a man for murder when a jury had con-
victed him only of illegally changing lanes while fleeing the scene of
the crime, suggesting that such a scheme subverts the constitutional
role of the jury.' 65 He then asserted: "The jury could not function as
circuitbreaker in the State's machinery ofjustice if it were relegated to
making a determination that the defendant at some point did some-
thing wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts
of the crime the State actually seeks to punish."1 66 The second alterna-
tive, Scalia said, was too subjective: "The second alternative is that leg-
islatures may establish legally essential sentencing factors within
limits-limits crossed when, perhaps, the sentencing factor is a 'tail
which wags the dog of the substantive offense.' "167 Scalia asserted that
the Framers included a constitutional right to trial by jury because
"they were unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the
160. Id. at 303.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 303-04.
163. Id. at 304.
164. Id. at 305-06.
165. Id. at 306.
166. Id. at 306-07.
167. Id. at 307 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)).
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jury."168 Once the Legislature determines that certain facts require
punishment, those facts must be found by a jury.
Scalia conceded that judicial fact finding is also endemic to inde-
terminate sentencing schemes. Indeterminate sentencing allows
judges broad discretion to sentence defendants within broad statutory
ranges. Judges often impose sentences after making factual determi-
nations about, for example, the circumstances of the offense or the
defendant's prior criminal history. When judges find facts in those
contexts, however, Scalia noted that those facts "do not pertain to
whether the defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence-and that
makes all the difference insofar as judicial impingement upon the
traditional role of the jury is concerned." 169 In Scalia's view, Blakely
was sentenced to three years more than he should have been based on
the crime to which he pled guilty.1 70 "The Framers would not have
thought it too much to demand that, before depriving a man of three
more years of his liberty, the State should suffer the modest inconve-
nience of submitting its accusation to 'the unanimous suffrage of
twelve of his equals and neighbors,' rather than a lone employee of
the State. ' 171 Rather, the right to jury trial is a "fundamental reserva-
tion of power in our constitutional structure."' 72
The Blakely decision generated three separate dissents. The first,
written by Justice O'Connor and joined in large part by the ChiefJus-
tice, 173 bitterly lamented that what she had "feared most' ' 174 has now
168. Id. at 308. The Court then disputed the State's claim that it was, in effect, deconsti-
tutionalizing all determinate sentencing schemes. Id. Rather, the Court stated that Blakely
dealt with how such schemes can be implemented consistent with the Sixth Amendment.
Id.
169. Id. at 309. As others have noted, there is a certain oddity-and perhaps a legal
fiction-implicit injustice Scalia's notion of a criminal defendant "bargaining" for a partic-
ular sentence when he commits a crime. In Scalia's view:
In a system that says the judge may punish burglary with 10 to 40 years, every
burglar knows he is risking 40 years in jail. In a system that punishes burglary with
a 10-year sentence, with another 30 added for use of a gun, the burglar who en-
ters a home unarmed is entitled to no more than a 10-year sentence-and by rea-
son of the Sixth Amendment the facts bearing upon that entitlement must be
found by jury.
Id.
170. Id. at 313.
171. Id. at 313-14 (quoting 4 W1LLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 343 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1769)).
172. Id. at 306.
173. Id. at 314 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor's dissent was joined by Breyer in
its entirety and in part by Chief justice Rehnquist and Kennedy. Rehnquist and Kennedy
did not join Part V-B of O'Connor's dissent, which specifically found that the majority's
opinion doomed the Guidelines.
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come to pass: "Over 20 years of sentencing reform are all but lost, and
tens of thousands of criminal judgments are in jeopardy." 175 She ac-
cused the majority of "doctrinaire formalism" in rejecting Washing-
ton's scheme on Sixth Amendment grounds and expressed a
preference for a "balanced case-by-case approach" to constitutional
challenges to sentencing. 176 In her view, the majority's "rigid rule"
would destroy progress made in sentencing reform.1 77 Of course, this
"balancing test" approach to constitutional rights is anathema to
Scalia.
While it is Breyer 178 and O'Connor, rather than Rehnquist, who
have been most closely associated with a spirited defense of the Guide-
lines, they have relied upon the principle articulated by Rehnquist
years earlier in the McMillan case. In McMillan, Rehnquist concluded
that it is largely up to the Legislature to determine what are elements
of a criminal offense (requiring proof to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt) and what are mere sentencing factors that can enhance a de-
fendant's sentence based upon judicial findings.' 79
Scalia's view is different. While he would agree that it is up to the
Legislature to determine what conduct is criminally punishable, when
a crime is defined by reference to specific facts, those facts must be
found by a jury.1 80 Thus, in Apprendi, where the Legislature provided
that a crime of violence motivated by hate should be punished more
severely, Scalia joined Stevens's opinion finding that the jury must
find the mens rea.181 Similarly, in Blakely, Scalia's majority opinion
made clear that where a statute called for an enhanced sentence if
174. Id. at 326. O'Connor first articulated this concern in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 549-59 (2000) (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
175. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 326 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 321.
177. Id. O'Connor also took issue with the maiority's claim to "the mantle of history
and original intent." Id. at 323. Relying on her earlier dissent in Apprendi, she explained
that broad sentencing discretion was a concept unknown to the Framers, so they never had
to consider the constitutional implications of a choice between "submitting every fact that
increases a sentence to the jury or vesting the sentencing judge with broad discretionary
authority to account for differences in offense and offenders." Id.
178. Justice Breyer was one of the first members of the United States Sentencing Com-
mission, which promulgated the Guidelines. See Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial
Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 717-18 (2005) (discussing Breyer's
commitment to the Guidelines); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 104, at 49-50
(describing Breyer's background and noting that he was Senator Edward Kennedy's "per-
sonal designee" on the Commission).
179. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (discussing McMillan).
180. See, e.g., Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306-09, 313-14.
181. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 492-93 (2000).
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kidnapping was committed with "deliberate cruelty," a finding of such
cruelty must be left to a jury rather than the judge. 182
This position has been criticized as being unduly formalistic, in
part because there is an easy evasion that the Legislature can make to
avoid jury fact finding: it can simply define crimes in broad, non-spe-
cific terms, providing broad discretion to judges to impose sentences
for the myriad ways in which the crime can be committed. Thus, a
legislature could provide for a broad term of five years to life for kid-
napping, leaving it to ajudge at sentencing to impose a long sentence
if, for example, the defendant acted with "deliberate cruelty" in the
judge's view.
Indeed, this "loophole" led to the Court's bizarre and fractured
ruling in United States v. Booker. In the first part of the opinion ("Booker
A"), the Court invalidated the Guidelines on the ground that the judi-
cial fact finding endemic to the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amend-
ment per Blakely. The second part of the opinion ("Booker B") then
purported to salvage the Guidelines by severing the provision making
them mandatory, essentially creating an advisory guidelines system.'183
Justice Stevens wrote Booker A (also referred to as the "merits ma-
jority"184), extending the logic of Blakely, predictably, to the Guide-
lines. He wrote for the same majority that had earlier decided Jones
and Apprendi as well as Blakely: Justices Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Thomas. Justice Breyer wrote Booker B (also referred to as the "reme-
dial majority"' 8 5 ) for a majority made up of the Jones-Apprendi-Blakely
dissenters (Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer) plus Justice
Ginsburg. 186 Booker B recast the Guidelines as "advisory" in order to
avoid the Sixth Amendment problem. Judges could then continue to
make the factual findings contemplated by the Guidelines 8 7-factual
findings that the Booker B majority thought it was important that
judges, rather than juries, continue to make. Booker B found 18 U.S.C.
182. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313-14.
183. See generally Darmer, supra note 25, at 534, 558-64 (describing the two holdings of
Booker).
184. Klein, supra note 178, at 695.
185. Id.
186. For a discussion of why Ginsburg may have "switched sides," see Klein, supra note
178, at 717 (citing Ginsburg's sympathy for Breyer as one possibility).
187. The Guidelines provide that judges make a number of factual findings, one of
their more controversial features. See Darmer, supra note 25, at 544-45. Judges make their
findings and then sentence according to a grid provided in the Guidelines. See id. at
540-43. As Stith and Cabranes stated, the judge's role under the Guidelines "is largely
limited to factual determinations and rudimentary arithmetic operations." STITH &
CABRANES, supra note 104, at 83.
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§ 3553(b) (1), the mandatory provision, to be incompatible with Booker
A's Sixth Amendment holding, and accordingly simply severed that
provision. 188 The Court also struck the provision establishing a de
novo standard of review on appeal, replacing it with an implicit "rea-
sonableness" review. 189
In dissenting from Booker B, Scalia noted that it was ironic that, in
order to "rescue from nullification a statutory scheme designed to
eliminate discretionary sentencing, it discards the provisions that elim-
inate discretionary sentencing."1 90 The Guidelines were largely moti-
vated by a desire to eliminate discretion in sentencing. Prior to Booker,
the Guidelines worked by providing that judges sentence within nar-
row ranges and by providing little discretion to deviate from those
ranges.
As I have argued elsewhere, while Stevens's Booker A opinion was
"a natural outgrowth of the Court's recent jurisprudence, Booker B
produced a jarring result in attempting to salvage as many current
features of the Guidelines as possible while effecting an end-run
around the Sixth Amendment requirements Booker A recognized."'1 91
The dissenters persuasively argued that the majority's analysis was
flawed by elevating "above all else the solitary role of the judge in
finding the 'real facts,' and emphasiz[ing], asJustice Scalia noted, the
'manner of achieving' uniformity rather than the actual achievement
of uniformity that was Congress's overriding goal" in promulgating
the Guidelines.' 92 The Booker B majority accepted and indeed pro-
moted judicial fact finding.
Accordingly, Scalia's triumph in this area of sentencing jurispru-
dence could be viewed as incomplete. Rehnquist was part of the Booker
B majority that salvaged the Guidelines. But they are Guidelines much
eviscerated. In response to Apprendi and then Blakely, far more factual
matters affecting sentences are already found by juries in both state
and federal courts. And while Booker B sought desperately to preserve
the status quo with respect to the Guidelines, the constraints of Booker
A mean that, importantly, judges are no longer required to make fac-
tual findings that lead inevitably to increased sentences-a key com-
ponent of the Guidelines that has long been the subject of
188. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
189. See Darmer, supra note 25, at 560-61.
190. 543 U.S. at 304 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's
holding in Booker B).
191. Darmer, supra note 25, at 564.
192. Id.
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criticism. 193 Fundamentally, Scalia-who has always been skeptical of
the Guidelines system-has managed to re-work the Guidelines by
forming an alliance with Stevens, in the process affecting not only the
Guidelines but sentencing more broadly. In any system in which par-
ticular facts require an increase to the sentence that would otherwise
apply, those facts must be found by a jury.
IV. "Testimonal Statements" and the Confrontation Clause
In the Confrontation Clause context, Scalia has consistently advo-
cated a strict interpretation giving full effect to the right to both con-
front and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 194 Rehnquist, however,
advocated more of a balancing approach. In Maryland v. Craig,19 5 for
example, Rehnquistjoined O'Connor's 5-4 majority opinion holding
the Sixth Amendment did not categorically prohibit a child in a sex-
ual abuse case from testifying against the defendant via closed-circuit
television and outside the defendant's presence. The Court found
that the "central concern of the Confrontation Clause" is reliability,
which can be achieved through means other than face-to-face con-
frontation. 196 The Court balanced the preference for face-to-face con-
frontation against the state's compelling interest in protecting alleged
child abuse victims from courtroom trauma.
Scalia wrote a stinging dissent, 97 asserting: "Seldom has this
Court failed so conspicuously to sustain a categorical guarantee of the
Constitution against the tide of prevailing current opinion."' 98 Find-
ing that the Sixth Amendment contained a clear categorical right to
confrontation, he accused the Court of supporting its "antitextual
conclusion by cobbling together scraps of dicta" from cases, such as
those involving classic hearsay statements, "that have no bearing
here."199
193. See id. at 544-45.
194. For example, in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), Scalia authored a majority
opinion, over Blackmun's dissent, which was joined by Justice Rehnquist, finding that the
use of a "screen" to shield a complaining witness from the defendant violated the latter's
Confrontation Clause rights. Id. at 1020-22.
195. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
196. Id. at 845-46.
197. He was joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. See id. at 860 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 863. In Scalia's view, the Sixth Amendment "does not literally contain a
prohibition upon [hearsay]," and thus case law dealing with hearsay is inapposite. Id. at
864-65.
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Scalia's dissent is a paradigmatic example of his hostility to the
balancing test approach of constitutional adjudication. He countered
the majority's concern for traumatized children with a searing histori-
cal account of individuals wrongly charged with child sexual abuse
crimes. 200 He then focused on direct confrontation as a means to un-
veil false accusations. 20 1 Ultimately, however, he pronounced that
whether cross-examination effectively undermines false testimony
does not determine the Constitutional requirement. In his words: "In
the last analysis, however, this debate is not an appropriate one. I have
no need to defend the value of confrontation, because the Court has
no authority to question it."202 Rather, should society determine that
the Confrontation Clause disserves the goal of seeking the truth, such
a constitutional "defect" can be cured by amendment.20 3 In the
meantime, the judiciary is simply not at liberty to ignore it, and the
majority "has applied 'interest-balancing' analysis where the text of
the Constitution simply does not permit it."204
Two terms later, the Court was confronted with a Confrontation
Clause challenge to hearsay statements in White v. Illinois.20 5 Rehn-
quist wrote the majority opinion rejecting the challenge. The case
again involved allegations of sexual assault of a child. 20 6 The accusa-
tions were deeply troubling, and Rehnquist characteristically outlined
them in some detail at the beginning of his opinion. 20 7 The victim
never testified at trial, but statements she had previously made were
introduced under hearsay exceptions for spontaneous statements and
statements made in pursuit of medical treatment. 208
Scaliajoined Thomas's concurring opinion, which foreshadowed
a new approach to Confrontation Clause analysis. 20 9 While agreeing
that the Court had reached the right result under prior precedent,
Thomas suggested that "our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has
evolved in a manner that is perhaps inconsistent with the text and
history of the Clause itself."210 In Ohio v. Roberts,211 for example, the
200. Id. at 868-69.
201. Id. at 869-70.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 870.
205. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
206. Id. at 349.
207. Id. at 349-51.
208. Id. at 350-51.
209. See id. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring).
210. Id.
211. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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Court had earlier interpreted the Clause to mean that hearsay testi-
mony from an unavailable witness could be admitted if it fell within a
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception or bore "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness."2 1 2 Roberts thus implied that the chief concern of
the Confrontation Clause was "unreliable hearsay," a proposition with
which the concurrence took issue.213 The concurrence suggested that
reliability is a due process concern, whereas the text and history of the
Confrontation Clause were focused specifically on a particular cate-
gory of out-of-court statements found in "formalized testimonial
materials," including "affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or con-
fessions." 214 According to Thomas's opinion, " [i] t was this discrete cat-
egory of testimonial materials that was historically abused by
prosecutors as a means of depriving criminal defendants of the bene-
fit of the adversary process .... "215
The seeds of this focus on "testimonial statements" took root in
Scalia's later opinion in Crawford v. Washington.21 6 And while Thomas
had earlier emphasized the narrowing of the Confrontation Clause
through an emphasis on "testimonial" materials, Scalia's opinion,
echoing some of Thomas's themes, also emphasized the critical role
of cross-examination for that species of hearsay.217 Thus, Scalia's opin-
ion explicitly vindicated a defendant's rights.
Crawford had been convicted, in part, upon his wife's out-of-
court statements made to the police about the circumstances of an
assault. Focusing on historic abuses such as those that occurred when
Sir Walter Raleigh was convicted based upon untested accusations,
Scalia argued that the Sixth Amendment was chiefly concerned with
"testimonial statements," for which there was an absolute right to con-
frontation in the form of cross-examination.218 Relying on the formu-
lation suggested by Justice Thomas in his earlier opinion in White, and
otherwise leaving the precise definition of "testimonial" to be more
fully developed in later cases, Scalia maintained that testimony in
prior judicial proceedings and statements made to police officers fell
clearly within the definition. 219
212. White, 502 U.S. at 363 (Thomas, J. concurring) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 365.
215. Id.
216. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
217. See id. at 53-56.
218. Id. at 44-45, 59.
219. Id. at 68.
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In laying out this formulation, Scalia found that the Roberts test
had failed to vindicate constitutional rights: "The unpardonable vice
of the Roberts test . . . is . . . its demonstrated capacity to admit core
testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to
exclude."220 According to Scalia, the lower courts' inconsistent treat-
ment of the wife's statements in Crawford-admitted by the trial court,
ruled inadmissible by the appellate court and then again found admis-
sible by the state supreme court-put "Roberts'failings ... on full dis-
play."22 1 Scalia thus found that this was "one of those rare cases in
which the result below is so improbable that it reveals a fundamental
failure on our part to interpret the Constitution in a way that secures
its intended constraint on judicial discretion. '" 222 Scalia's opinion set
aside Crawford's conviction on the ground that the introduction of
his wife's testimonial hearsay violated his Confrontation Clause
rights. 223
While agreeing that Crawford's conviction should be set aside,
Rehnquist filed a separate concurring opinion, dissenting from the
Court's decision to "overrule" Roberts.224 In his view, the "testimonial"
formulation had no more to recommend it than did the Court's prior
longstanding approach. Accordingly, Rehnquist found the new ap-
proach to be unnecessary: "The result the Court reaches follows inex-
orably from Roberts and its progeny without any need for overruling
that line of cases." 22 5 Rehnquist's loyalty to Roberts, however, was not
widely shared; only one other Justice joined his concurrence. While
conceding Rehnquist's point in concurrence that the case could have
been resolved by simply performing the proper Roberts analysis and
finding the wife's statements unreliable, Scalia found that such an ap-
proach would only have compounded the Sixth Amendment prob-
lem. In Scalia's view, cross-examination was the only appropriate
vehicle for testing the reliability of the statement: "The Constitution
prescribes a procedure for determining the reliability of testimony in
criminal trials, and we, no less than the state courts, lack authority to
replace it with one of our own devising."22 6
220. Id. at 63.
221. Id. at 65-66.
222. Id. at 67.
223. Id. at 68-69.
224. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
225. Id. at 76.
226. Id. at 67 (majority opinion).
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Continuing with the theme about the appropriately limited role
of judges that has animated his sentencing jurisprudence, Scalia said
the following:
We have no doubt that the courts below were acting in utmost
good faith when they found reliability. The Framers, however,
would not have been content to indulge this assumption. They
knew that judges, like other government officers, could not always
be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people .... They were
loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands .... By replac-
ing categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended balanc-
ing tests, we do violence to their design. Vague standards are
manipulable, and, while that might be a small concern in run-of-
the-mill assault prosecutions like this one, the Framers had an eye
toward politically charged cases like Raleigh's-great state trials
where the impartiality of even those at the highest levels of the
judiciary might not be so clear. It is difficult to imagine Roberts'
providing any meaningful protection in those circumstances.
22 7
Scalia garnered a substantial majority in overruling Roberts and
taking a new approach to the Confrontation Clause. Only Justice
O'Connor joined Rehnquist's opinion.
Moreover, in the Court's next case dealing with the Confronta-
tion Clause in Davis v. Washington,228 Scalia again achieved near-una-
nimity in an opinion that dealt with two domestic violence cases.22 9 In
those cases, Scalia expanded upon the definition of "testimonial." He
found statements "non-testimonial" and thus admissible when made
in response to police interrogation "under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." He found state-
ments "testimonial" and thus inadmissible when the interrogation's
primary purpose is "to establish or prove past events potentially rele-
vant to later criminal prosecution. '" 23 0 Scalia achieved a unanimous
result in one case, finding statements made to a 911 operator non-
testimonial.23 1 In the second case, where Scalia found statements to
be testimonial when made to a police officer at the scene of a recent
domestic violence episode, only Justice Thomas dissented. 232 In the
227. Id. at 67-68.
228. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). This case was argued and decided after ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist's death.
229. The companion case to Davis was Hammon v. Indiana. See id.
230. Id. at 2273-74.
231. Id. at 2276-78.
232. Id. at 2281 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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course of his majority opinion, Scalia reiterated that Crawford had
overruled the "reliability" approach of Roberts.233
Conclusion
Rehnquist did not simply preside over a Court that greatly influ-
enced criminal procedure law; he personally shaped much of that law
himself. In the waning years of his Court, however, he was unable to
maintain control of the Court's sentencing or Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. The deliberate, incrementalist approach he so success-
fully followed in developing a more pro-police Fourth and Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence did not work for him in two key Sixth
Amendment contexts. With regard to the Confrontation Clause, he
clung to earlier formulations that his colleagues had grown dis-
enchanted with, and Scalia's "testimonial" approach won support
both from fellow textualist Thomas as well as the Court's more liberal
members.
In the sentencing cases, Rehnquist took a passive role, writing
none of the myriad opinions filed in Almendarez-Torres, Jones, Apprendi,
Blakely, or Booker. Conversely, Scalia's lone objection to the Guidelines
when they were first promulgated evolved into a sustained, Sixth
Amendment-based attack on judicial fact finding that was a critical-
and ultimately vulnerable-lynchpin of the Guidelines system. Rehn-
quist's ready acceptance of the legitimacy of judicial fact finding, ar-
ticulated pre-Guidelines in McMillan, ultimately could not sustain
Stevens's early reservations when invigorated and refined by Scalia's
Sixth Amendment vision.
The lack of a Sixth Amendment "whipping boy" may have ener-
vated Rehnquist's jurisprudence, as well. The Warren Court's most fa-
mous Sixth Amendment decision, Gideon v. Wainwright,234 stood in
sharp contrast to Mapp and Miranda by being both the product of a
unanimous Court and a case that was well received by the public at
large. 23 5 Moreover, the interests vindicated by Booker and Crawford in-
volved different aspects of the Sixth Amendment than those at issue in
Gideon. Sentencing guidelines were not part of the legal landscape
when Rehnquistjoined the Court, and Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence was not a central aspect of the "Warren Revolution." Unlike
Mapp and Miranda, where Rehnquist had a clear agenda, there was no
233. Id. at 2280 (majority opinion).
234. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
235. Cf Bradley, supra note 72, at 279 (noting that Rehnquist "has never expressed any
disagreement" with the Gideon line of cases).
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clear Sixth Amendment mission when Rehnquist joined the Court.
When Sixth Amendment issues developed later on the Court, Rehn-
quist failed either to articulate a clear vision (in the sentencing guide-
line cases) or to persuade his colleagues to adhere to the old regime
(in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence). Scalia, in contrast, started
out openly hostile to the Guidelines as well as to much of the Court's
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
How the Booker and Crawford issues will sort themselves out in the
future remains to be seen. Not as much of a pragmatist as Rehnquist,
Scalia is less concerned with such issues as how sentencing guidelines
will work in a post-Booker world or how, for example, domestic vio-
lence cases can be successfully prosecuted post-Crawford.23 6 What is
plain, however, is that lower courts and legislatures grappling with
these issues are dealing with issues that Rehnquist did not bequeath.
In the waning days of the Rehnquist Court, the Sixth Amendment was
Scalia's.
236. Cf Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (finding statements non-testimonial and admissi-
ble in one domestic violence case and testimonial and thus inadmissible in a companion
case).
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